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Expansion of supermarkets in developing countries is increasingly providing opportunities for 
farmers to participate in modern supply chains. While some farmers are excluded by stringent 
supermarket requirements, there are important gains for participating farmers. However, studies 
analyzing income effects of high-value chains use approaches that either show no causality or 
ignore structural differences between farmers in different channels. Using endogenous switching 
regression and data from a survey of vegetable growers in Kenya, we account for systematic 
differences and show that participation in supermarket chains yields 50% gain in household 
income leading to 33% reduction in poverty. Supermarket expansion is therefore likely to have 
substantial welfare effects if more farmers are supported to overcome inherent entry barriers. 
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1.  Introduction 
Increasing demand for high-value food products in developing countries is creating incentives 
for expansion of supermarkets (Neven et al., 2006; Reardon et al., 2003). And in order to meet 
arising consumer concerns, emerging supermarkets increasingly adopt tighter vertical 
coordination involving direct procurement from farmers. These changes have crucial 
implications for farm households. While there is potential for exclusion of some farmers due to 
stringent requirements imposed by supermarkets, there are also potential welfare gains for 3 
 
farmers who have access to these channels. Stable prices and contractual arrangements offered 
by supermarkets for instance, improve income flows for farmers in supermarket channels. 
Expansion of supermarkets in developing countries can therefore have substantial effects on farm 
household income and on rural poverty in general.  
In light of these changes, there is a growing body of literature analyzing implications of 
supermarket expansion for rural households (Neven and Reardon, 2004; Pingali et al., 2007; 
Reardon et al., 2009). Most studies focus on determinants of participation in supermarket 
channels and institutional innovations for integrating farmers into these modern supply chains 
(Hernandez et al., 2007; Moustier et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009). Some studies also evaluate 
welfare effects of emerging supermarket chains in developing countries. However, current 
studies on welfare effects employ gross margin analysis (Hernandez et al., 2007; Neven et al., 
2009) that do not reveal causality. While there may be significant differences in gross margins 
across market channels, such differences cannot be attributed to participation in supermarket 
chains without analytical procedures that show causality. 
On the other hand there are also studies on the welfare effects of global supply chains (Bolwig et 
al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Warning and 
Key, 2002; Wollni and Zeller, 2007). These global chains involve contracting of farmers in 
developing countries for export markets and the respective studies use standard treatment effect 
models to measure welfare effects while accounting for sample selection. However, the treatment 
models assume uniform effect across groups of observations. Yet evidence from recent studies 
show systematic differences between farmers supplying supermarkets and their counterparts in 
traditional channels (Hernandez et al., 2007; Neven et al., 2009). Welfare measures such as 4 
 
income are therefore likely to differ structurally, depending on the market channels, especially if 
participation in supermarket channels is also associated with the factors that affect income.  
If income functions indeed differ across market channels, then assuming uniform effect conceals 
inherent interaction between channel adoption and other factors influencing income. This can 
lead to inappropriate policy recommendation. Furthermore, understanding how factors affecting 
income interact with decision to participate in supermarket channels is also crucial, particularly 
in developing innovations aimed at enhancing famer participation in these channels.  
In this paper, we analyze income effects of participation in supermarket chains using more 
efficient correction for sample selection. We use a switching regression model that treats market 
channels as regimes and thus allows for structural differences in income functions of farmers 
across market channels. And to account for some unobserved factors that jointly influence 
household income and choice of market channel, we use an endogenous version of the switching 
model. This yields income effects that vary according to market regimes, thus providing more 
accurate information that can aid targeting of market access interventions. We hypothesize an 
intercept shift in income function due to supermarket participation and an interaction between 
the choice of market channel and other factors influencing income.  
Moreover, our approach allows us to simulate potential poverty effects of modern supply chains. 
To our knowledge none of the previous studies on welfare effects of supermarket expansion has 
analyzed potential effects on household income and poverty. Our study therefore provides 
further insights into welfare effects of modern supply chain and yields more accurate information 
for targeted welfare intervention. The study builds on primary data from a survey of vegetable 
farmers in Kiambu district of Central Kenya. Supermarkets have been expanding rapidly in 5 
 
Kenya and are already venturing into sales of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FFV) (Neven and 
Reardon, 2004). Given the role of horticulture in the Kenyan economy, continued expansion of 
supermarket channels into FFV sales is therefore likely to have substantial welfare effects for 
farm households. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the analytical framework and 
estimation procedure for our study. In section three we describe the data and undertake some 
descriptive analysis. This is followed by section four where we present and discuss results of our 
estimation. Section five concludes the study. 
2.  Analytical framework and estimation procedures 
Participation in supermarket chains can be viewed as a binary choice resulting from 
maximization of utility or returns. Utility is in turn determined by a set of exogenous variables Z, 
which influence the cost of adjusting to a market option with new requirements. Variables in Z 
also determine the relative returns that a farmer can earn from supermarket and spot market 
channels. These variables can therefore include farm or household characteristics, asset 
ownership and human capital such as education that determine the cost of adjusting to 
requirements of a new market.  
In choosing market options, farmers therefore compare expected utility of participation in 
supermarket chains   against utility of participating in traditional markets   and supermarket 
channel is chosen if  . However,   and   are latent and what is observed is participation 
in supermarket chains  where  if   and  if . Participation in supermarket 
chains can therefore be represented as follows; 
       ( 1 )  6 
 
where   is a vector of parameters and   is an error term with zero mean and variance  . Since 
farmers are heterogeneous in their characteristics, not all farmers will overcome the adjustment 
costs to be able to supply in supermarket chains.  Nevertheless, participation in supermarkets 
often yield returns that can positively affect household income. This could be due to better and 
stable prices and steady flow of revenues due to market assurance. 
2.1.  Modeling income effects  
The resulting income effects can be estimated using the following model: 
       ( 2 )   
where is income; is farm and household characteristics known to be affecting household 
income; and    is a dummy variable for participation in supermarket chains. However, income 
response to supermarket participation can originate from two sources. First, differences may 
arise purely due to characteristic differences in market channels, even if farmers do not differ in 
characteristics. Stable prices and market assurance by supermarkets could lead to improved and 
continuous flow of revenues as opposed to fluctuations that are a general characteristic of spot 
markets.  
Secondly, if participation in supermarket chains is associated with farmer characteristics, then we 
would still observe differences in income between market channels. However, due to the self-
selection, this difference cannot be wholly attributed to differences in market channels. The 
dummy  (I) in equation (2) would therefore provide a bias estimate for income effect of 
supermarket participation. Heckman selection-correction model corrects for the self-selection but 
assumes uniform effects across market channels. This can still lead to bias estimates if there are 
systematic differences across groups of farmers in different market channels. Maertens and 7 
 
Swinnen (2009) use an alternative approach based on propensity score matching. However, 
propensity score matching controls for selection on observables and may still yield bias estimates 
if hidden bias is substantial. A more suitable approach that corrects for self-selection and 
accounts for systematic differences across groups of households is a switching model (Maddala, 
1983). The model treats market channels as regime shifters and can be represented as follows: 
          
          
             ( 3 )  
where   and represents household income for supermarket and traditional channel suppliers 
respectively while   is a latent variable determining which regime applies.  and   are sets of 
parameters to be estimated and the variable sets   and   are allowed to overlap. Note that   and  
 are only partially observed -  is only observed for the sample belonging to supermarket 
regime and   for the sample belonging to traditional channels. So what is totally observed is a 
single variable   defined as follows: 
 
                 (4) 
From (3),   and   are residuals that are only contemporaneously correlated and are assumed 
to be jointly normally distributed with a mean vector 0, and covariance matrix as follows: 
                  (5) 8 
 
where ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  and 
. The variance of v is set to one since  is estimable only up to a scale factor 
(Greene, 2008; Maddala, 1986). In addition  since  and  are never observed together 
(Dutoit, 2007).  
The switching model so far outlined only accounts for self-selection on observed factors. Yet 
there could be unmeasured factors that jointly determine participation in supermarket chains and 
household income. Better management skills and entrepreneurial ability can for instance lead to 
higher farm/household income. These innate abilities can also influence decision to participate in 
supermarket channels. Furthermore, income status may influence supermarket participation by 
enhancing farmers’ ability to invest in equipment necessary for participation in supermarket 
chains.  This implies correlation between the error terms of regime equations and the error term 
 in selection equation and hence the need for endogenous switching regression model.  
Estimates of the covariance terms can therefore provide a test for endogeneity. If   
then we have an exogenous switching and if either  or   is non-zero, then we have a model 
with endogenous switching (Maddala, 1986). The test is achieved by testing for significance of 
correlation coefficient computed as  and (Lokshin and Sajaia, 
2004). Assuming these correlations, the expected values of truncated error terms can be 
expressed as follows; 
    (6) 
     (7) 9 
 
where   and    are probability density and cumulative distribution of the standard normal 
distribution respectively.  and   are the ratios of   and    evaluated at   - Inverse Mills 
Ratios (IMR) (Greene, 2008).  
Besides providing a test for endogeneity, the signs of correlation coefficients  and  have 
economic interpretation. If and   have alternate signs, then farmers choose supermarket 
channels on the basis of their comparative advantage (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995; Maddala, 1983; 
Trost, 1981; Willis and Rosen, 1979). Thus, if , then farmers having income above 
average income for supermarket suppliers have higher than expected chances of participating in 
supermarket channels. Similarly if , then individuals with incomes above average income 
of farmers supplying traditional channels have lower than expected chance of supplying 
supermarkets.  Consequently farmers who supply supermarket channels will have above average 
returns from supplying supermarkets. Similarly those who supply traditional channels have 
above average returns from supplying traditional channels. 
Alternatively when   and  , then there is evidence of “hierarchical sorting” (Fuglie 
and Bosch, 1995; Trost, 1981). In other words, supermarket suppliers have above average returns 
whether or not they participate in supermarket channels but are better off in supermarket 
channels. Similarly, traditional channel suppliers have below average returns in either case but 
are better off supplying traditional channels. Interpretation of the covariance terms also provides 
proof for consistency of the model which requires that . This condition also implies 
that supermarket suppliers earn higher income than they would earn if they supplied traditional 
channels(Trost, 1981). 10 
 
2.2 Estimation  procedure 
Assuming correlation of the error terms implied in equations (6) and (7), a two-stage method can 
be used to estimate the model. The first stage probit model [ ] provides estimates of 
which are then used to estimate the IMRs [ and ]. The IMRs are then treated as “missing 
variables” in estimating regime equations in (3) by OLS. In order to identify the model we need 
to ensure that at least one variable in Z does not appear in X. The coefficients of IMRs would 
then provide estimates of covariance terms  and  . This approach yields consistent but 
inefficient estimates of parameters especially if coefficients of  and   are nonzero (Fuglie and 
Bosch, 1995; Trost, 1981). A more efficient approach is the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method for endogenous switching regression (Greene, 2008; Lokshin and 
Sajaia, 2004). This provides for joint estimation of regime equations and the selection equation. 
Note that the coefficients  and  in equation (3) measure the marginal effects of independent 
variables on household income unconditional on farmers actual market choice, i.e. the potential 
effect of X on the sample. If there are variables that appear both in X and Z, the coefficients can, 
however, be used to estimate conditional effects as follows; 
    (8) 
Equation (7) decomposes effect of change in   into two parts:   is the direct effect on the 
mean of  ; the second part is the indirect effect from market choice that appears as a result of 
correlation between unobserved component of   and I.  
2.3. Estimating  income  effect  of supermarket participation 11 
 
In order to evaluate the income effect of participation in supermarket channels, we need to 
estimate conditional expectation of income per capita that participants would have without 
participation in supermarket channels (Maddala, 1983). This can be estimated, holding other 
characteristics constant via the following steps. Assuming a farmer with farm and individual 
characteristics (X, Z) who participates in supermarket chains, the expected value of    is: 
      ( 9 )  
where the last term takes into account sample selectivity. For the same farm, predicted value of 
(expected value of y if the same farm does not participate) is: 
      ( 1 0 )  
The change in income per capita due to participation in supermarket channels would then be: 
    (11) 
If self-selection is based on comparative advantage,   would be greater than zero and 
supplying supermarkets will produce greater benefits under self-selection than under random 
assignment (Maddala, 1983). 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Farm  survey 
Data for this study was collected in 2008 from Kiambu District of Central Province in Kenya. 
Kiambu is located in relative proximity to Nairobi and even before the spread of supermarkets it 
has been one of the main vegetable-supplying areas for the capital city. Based on information 
from the district agricultural office, four of the main vegetable-producing divisions were chosen. 12 
 
In these four divisions, 31 administrative locations were purposively selected, again using 
statistical information on vegetable production. Within the locations, vegetable farmers were 
sampled randomly. Since farmers that participate in supermarket channels are still the minority, 
we oversampled them using complete lists obtained from supermarkets and supermarket traders. 
In total, our sample comprises 402 farmers – 133 supermarket suppliers and 269 supplying 
vegetables to traditional markets. Using a structured questionnaire, these farmers were 
interviewed on vegetable production and marketing details, other farm and non-farm economic 
activities, as well as household and contextual characteristics. 
Both types of farmers produce vegetables in addition to maize, bananas, and other cash crops. 
The main vegetables produced are leafy vegetables, including exotic ones such as spinach and 
kale, and indigenous ones such as amaranthus and black nightshade, among others.
1  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 shows the different marketing channels for vegetables used by sampled farmers. Some 
supermarket suppliers also sell vegetables in traditional spot markets when they have excess 
supply. However, for analytical purposes, farmers that supply at least part of their vegetables to 
supermarkets are classified as supermarket suppliers. 
Spot markets sales are one-off transactions between farmers and retailers or consumers with 
neither promise for repeated transactions nor prior agreements on product delivery or price. 
Depending on the demand and supply situation, prices are subject to wide fluctuation. Farmers 
who are unable to supply directly to wholesale or retail markets sell their produce to spot market 
traders who act as intermediaries. Such traders collect vegetables at the farm gate without any 
prior agreement. In contrast, supermarkets do have agreements with vegetable farmers regarding 13 
 
product price, physical quality and hygiene, and consistency and regularity in supply (Ngugi et 
al., 2007). Price agreements are made before delivery, and prices are relatively stable. Payments 
are usually only once a week or every two weeks. All agreements are verbal with no written 
contract. Some farmers also supply supermarkets through special traders. Based on similar verbal 
agreements, these traders again maintain regular contacts with farmers, in order to be able to 
supply supermarkets in a timely and consistent way. Strict supply requirements by supermarkets 
have led to specialization among traders. Consequently supermarket traders tend to exclusively 
supply modern retail outlets.
2 
Given the risk of exclusion from emerging modern supply chains for disadvantaged farmers, 
there are various organizations in Kenya linking smallholders to supermarket and export 
channels. One such organization active in Kiambu is the NGO Farm Concern International 
(FCI). FCI trains farmer groups on production of indigenous vegetables before linking them to 
various supermarkets in Nairobi (Moore and Raymond, 2006; Ngugi et al., 2007). FCI also 
promotes collective action and – through training efforts – helps farmers to meet the strict 
delivery standards imposed by supermarkets. Our sample covers 80 vegetable farmers currently 
involved in the FCI project in Kiambu District. Out of these, more than half were already 
supplying supermarkets at the time of our survey. 
3.2. Descriptive  analysis 
Table 1 shows some descriptive comparison of the two groups of farmers. Farmers in the two 
market channels show differences in land ownership, vegetable area cultivated and in the use of 
irrigation equipment. They also show differences in education levels and farming experience. On 
average, supermarket suppliers own more land and cultivate significantly large area of 
vegetables. They also tend to specialize in vegetable production judging from the significant 14 
 
difference in share of vegetable area. Significantly greater proportion of supermarket suppliers 
also use advanced irrigation technology, which is seemingly a move to meet supermarket 
requirement for consistent supply of vegetables. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Supermarket suppliers are also significantly younger but have shorter farming experience 
compared to spot market suppliers. Significantly larger proportion of supermarket suppliers also 
engages in off-farm employment.  
Apart from differences in various socioeconomic variables of interest, we carry out economic 
analysis of participation in supermarket channels. In Table 2 we present a comparison of gross 
margin between farmers in the two market channels. 
Insert Table 2 here 
The two groups of farmers show significant differences both in revenues and expenditure on 
inputs. The differences in revenue is driven both by yields and prices which are higher for 
supermarket suppliers. In terms of costs, supermarket suppliers spend significantly more on hired 
labour and purchased manure. These higher expenditures reflect higher use of respective inputs 
as shown in Table 1. Supermarkets use more labor partly due to extra workforce needed for 
packing of vegetables (Neven et al., 2009) and partly due to more regular use of certain inputs 
such as purchased manure. This extra demand for hired labor by supermarket suppliers implies 
employment creation for rural landless households. Farmers supplying supermarkets, however 
use slightly less inorganic fertilizer. Instead, they use more farmyard manure, which they believe 
leads to quicker regeneration of leaves after harvest. This is particularly important for 
supermarket suppliers that have to supply vegetables more regularly. 15 
 
These differences in revenues and costs result into significantly higher net income per acre for 
supermarket suppliers. The picture remains the same even after imputing values for own inputs 
such as family labor and own farmyard manure. Unsurprisingly, traditional channel suppliers use 
significantly more family labor in vegetable production. These differences in average values of 
gross margin are replicated across the entire distribution as can be seen from Figure 2. The CDF 
of gross margin for supermarket suppliers significantly dominate the CDF for spot market 
suppliers. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The higher net margin somehow also contributes to higher farm incomes for supermarket 
suppliers. However, supermarket suppliers also have higher non-farm income and a combination 
of the two income sources yields higher total household income for supermarket suppliers. This 
is true both for farmers supplying supermarket on their own as well as for farmers supplying 
supermarket via institutional support from FCI. Compared to farmers supplying supermarkets on 
their own, FCI-supported farmers are nevertheless inferior in all the income classes. This already 
provides an indication of structural differences in household income between supermarket and 
traditional channel suppliers. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Besides the average values in Figure 3, we also show cumulative distribution of per capita 
household income by market channels in Figures 4. The two figures show that supermarket 
farmers are significantly superior in both farm and household income nearly across the entire 
distribution.  16 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
These superior income distributions translate into lower poverty incidence among supermarket 
suppliers as can be seen from Figure 5. Poverty incidences were calculated based on 1.25 dollar 
and 2 dollar poverty lines converted to local currency equivalents using purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rates. The PPP rates for Kenya was 1 dollar to 29.52 Kenya shillings as at 2005 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008). This has been updated to 
current rates using consumer price index. Relative to the rest of the country, Kiambu district has 
lower poverty rates and therefore lower poverty incidences in our sample should not be a 
surprise. Kiambu is indeed the least poor district in Kenya with a rural poverty incidence of 22% 
(Ndeng'e et al., 2003). 
Insert Figure 5 here 
Besides income, land can also be a sign of wealth and may therefore influence participation in 
supermarket channels if channel choice is based on relative wealth status of farmers. We 
therefore show distribution of land ownership by market channels in Figure 6. While on average 
supermarket farmers tend to own significantly more land, a disaggregated analysis show a 
slightly different picture.  
Insert Figure 6 here 
Excluding supermarket farmers supported by FCI, it appears the two market channels have less 
difference in land ownership. This is true for the three categories of land ownership. We also 
realize that the FCI-supported group of supermarket suppliers has the largest share of farmers 
with relatively more land. Differences in average values shown in Table 1 are therefore largely 
driven the share of FCI farmers owning more than three acres of land. Most farmers currently 17 
 
supplying supermarket through FCI-supported linkage are located in Githunguri and Lower Lari 
regions where farmers generally own more land. These are the regions much further from 
Nairobi where there is still relatively less subdivision of land. Looking at average values alone 
may therefore give an unrealistic impression that supermarket channels favor large farmers. 
4.  Econometric Analysis 
The descriptive analysis explored so far reveal significant differences in income and other 
socioeconomic characteristics between farmers in the two market channels. While we have 
attempted some distributive analyses that reveal some facts usually concealed by averages, it still 
remains uncertain if revealed differences can be attributed to participation in supermarket 
channels. To confirm causality we need econometric approaches that link supermarket 
participation and income outcomes. 
As outlined in the methodology we apply an endogenous switching regression model to estimate 
income effects of participation in supermarket channels. The income model is estimated jointly 
with the model for participation in supermarket channels. We therefore present results for 
channel choice before discussing income effects of participation in supermarket channels. 
4.1  Determinants of participation in supermarket channels 
Results for determinants of participation in supermarket channels are presented in Table 3. 
Alongside typical farm and household characteristics, we hypothesize that institutional support 
through FCI enhances farmer access to supermarket channels. Therefore, we include 
participation in the FCI market linkage program as an additional explanatory variable – defined 
as a dummy. Yet, participation in that program might potentially be endogenous, which would 
lead to a bias in the coefficient estimate. We test for endogeneity of the FCI dummy using a two-18 
 
step approach suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988). Using membership in a farmer group, 
which is correlated with FCI but not with supermarket channel participation, as an instrument, 
we run a probit regression of FCI. Predicted residuals from this regression are then included as 
additional explanatory variable in supermarket participation model and the null hypothesis to be 
tested is that residuals are not significant – implying exogeneity of FCI variable. The test fails to 
reject this null hypothesis (p = 0.664). So we proceed with the analysis assuming the FCI 
variable to be exogenous. The probit model is estimated jointly with the income function using 
endogenous switching model as illustrated under section 2.2. 
Insert Table 3 here 
The findings show that participation in supermarket channels depends on level of education and 
age of the farmer. Better educated farmers are more likely to participate in supermarket channels. 
Bette educated farmers tend to be more innovative and are therefore more likely to adopt modern 
marketing channels. The relationship between age and participation in supermarket channels 
assumes an inverted U-shape indicating that middle-aged farmers are more likely to participate 
in supermarket channels.   
Farmers who engage in off-farm employment are also more likely to participate in supermarkets. 
This could be due to capital investment necessary for participation in supermarket channels 
which is seemingly supported by income from off-farm activities. Ownership of land of land also 
has a positive and significant influence on supermarket participation. This result should, 
however, be interpreted with caution since as shown in the descriptive statistics, distribution of 
land ownership does not vary much when we exclude the sample of farmers supported by FCI.  19 
 
Access to public transport and ownership of means of transport also enhances farmers’ access to 
supermarket channels. This result underscores the general importance of infrastructure in 
meeting supermarket requirement for timely and regular delivery of vegetables. 
Finally, institutional support by FCI has a positive and significant influence on supermarket 
participation. FCI negotiates with supermarkets on behalf of farmers, facilitates collective 
marketing approach by farmers and offers training to farmer groups on production technique and 
supermarket requirements. This reduces transaction costs and makes smallholder farmers more 
reliable trading partners for supermarkets. Equally important is the invoice discounting service 
by FCI, which enables even relatively poor households with immediate cash needs to participate 
in supermarket channels, despite the lagged payment schedule. These are important findings 
from a policy perspective. Where no NGO like FCI is operating, public agencies might 
potentially take on such roles of institutional support. 
4.2  Income effect of participation in modern supply chains 
While there could be limited access to supermarkets for disadvantaged farmers, those with access 
could realize improvement in household income due to better price and steady flow of revenues. 
Given possibility for systematic differences between farmers in the two channels, we expect 
income responses to control variables to vary depending on market channels. Results for the 
endogenous switching model are presented in Table 4. To identify the model, two variables in 
the probit model – dummy for participation in FCI project and access to public transportation are 
excluded from the income function.  
Results indicate that suppliers to the two market channels indeed have incomes that differ 
structurally from each other. For supermarket farmers, off-farm employment and ownership of 20 
 
own means of transport have a positive and significant effect on household income per capita. 
The significance of off-farm employment in both channel choice and income model for 
supermarket suppliers is an indication of joint determination of income status and channel 
choice. Off-farm employment also has a positive and significant impact on income per capita for 
spot market suppliers but the effect is smaller.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Ownership of own means of transport is also significantly positive for both channels but the 
effect is much higher for supermarket suppliers. This could be an indication of the activities that 
the means of transport supports. For supermarket suppliers own cars are used for delivery of 
vegetables to supermarkets which could be generating more returns than sport market suppliers’ 
activities supported by own cars.  
Land ownership also influences income positively and significantly but only for spot market 
suppliers. More land often implies more output and this can positively affect farm income 
leading to higher household income. Farmers with more land can also lease out portions of their 
land for income. Use of advanced irrigation technology also matters for income of spot market 
suppliers. This could be an indication of self-selection into supermarket on the basis of use of 
advanced irrigation technology. It is also an indication that spot market suppliers who use 
irrigation have the chance to supply vegetable during off-season when prices are generally higher 
and are thus able to generate more revenues than farmers without advanced irrigation 
technology. Ownership of livestock also has a positive and significant effect on income for spot 
market suppliers. In response to seasonal fluctuation in vegetable market especially in the 
traditional channels, most farmers diversify into dairy activities where prices of milk remain 
relatively stable. It is therefore likely that farmers facing uncertainty in vegetable markets will 21 
 
diversify into dairy farming. Hence the relative importance of livestock keeping for spot market 
suppliers. 
The lower panel of Table 4 reports estimates for the covariance terms. The terms have similar 
signs, which is an indication of “hierarchical sorting”. Supermarket suppliers therefore have 
above average returns whether or not they participate in supermarket channels but are better off 
in supermarket channels. The covariance estimate for spot market suppliers is, however, 
insignificantly different from zero. Furthermore, since , we find evidence of self-
selection based on comparative advantage. Farmers with income above average per capita 
income for supermarket suppliers therefore have higher than expected chances of participating in 
supermarket channels. The model also fulfils the necessary condition for consistency 
[ ]. Supermarket suppliers therefore earn higher income than they would earn if they 
supplied traditional channels.  
We also show the likelihood ratio test for joint independence of the three equations. The test 
shows significant dependence between selection and income equations; thus indicating further 
evidence of endogeneity. It is also important to note that in the absence of supermarket 
participation, there would be no significant difference in average behavior of the two categories 
of farmers caused by unobserved effects. This is evident from the insignificance of the 
covariance estimate for spot market suppliers. 
Finally we also estimate income effects as illustrated in equation (10). Results for estimation of 
equation (11) are presented in Table 5, where effects are presented for different categories of 
farmers. We also use the predicted household income to simulate poverty incidence. Poverty 
incidence is estimated using predicted income with participation in supermarket channels. This is 22 
 
then compared to potential poverty incidence that would be realized if supermarket suppliers 
were supplying traditional channels. Results are shown in the lower panel of Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Results show significant gains in per capita income due to participation in supermarket channels. 
This is true for the whole sample of supermarket suppliers and for different categories of 
supermarket suppliers. For the whole sample of supermarket suppliers, participation in 
supermarket channels yields a fifty-percentage increase in per capita income. However, smaller 
farmers owning less than one acre of land and the extremely poor supermarket suppliers benefit 
over-proportionally. Poorer farmers tend to engage largely in subsistence farming. Participation 
in supermarket channels for such households thus provides an avenue for commercialization 
farm activities leading to substantial gains in household income.    
Farmers supplying directly to supermarkets also gain more from supermarket participation as 
compared to their counterparts supplying through traders. In the absence of intermediaries, a 
bigger share of price premium paid by high-value consumers accrues to producers leading to 
significant gains for direct suppliers. The over-proportional gains in income for poor farmers 
lead to larger significant reduction in poverty for the poorer category of supermarket suppliers. 
These results should, however, be interpreted with caution since the proportion of poorer farmers 
supplying supermarkets is quite small and may not reflect the general extent of benefit for the 
wider poor households. The estimation also assumes constant characteristics of household in 
alternative market channels. This is a strong assumption since we cannot guarantee that 
supermarket farmers would exhibit similar characteristics if they were in spot market channels. 
Nevertheless, the findings show that there is scope for improving household income via 23 
 
participation in modern supply chains. 
5.  Conclusion 
Increasing demand for high-value food commodities and resulting expansion of supermarkets in 
developing countries is providing opportunities for farmers to participate in modern supply 
chains. While stringent conditions by supermarkets may limit some farmers from accessing 
supermarkets channels, participating farmers stand to gain substantially. Recent studies on high-
value chains in developing countries have looked into determinants of access and potential gains 
from participation. However, these studies either adopt gross margin analyses which show no 
causality or use treatment effect models that assume uniform effect across farmers in different 
market channels.  
Based on primary survey data of vegetable growers in Kenya, we find that better educated and 
middle-aged farmers are more likely to participate in supermarket channels. Land and off-farm 
employment which are indications of wealth status also increase the chances for participation in 
supermarket channels by farmers. Supermarkets also favor farmers with better access to 
infrastructure and those with own means of transport. More importantly, institutional support is 
shown to enhance participation of farmers in supermarket channels.  
Furthermore, we have also shown that participation in supermarket channels yields significant 
income gains.  Yet the two groups of farmers have different income structures. Since, our 
analysis shows joint determination of income and supermarket channel choice, having accurate 
information on income determinants is crucial in designing policies aimed at enhancing farmers’ 
access to high-value markets. Given the joint role of off-farm employment for instance, policies 
supporting off-farm enterprises are likely to yield greater returns for spot market suppliers. Far 24 
 
from directly improving household income, such policies would facilitate spot market suppliers’ 
access to high-value chains. This would lead to further improvements in household income – 
producing a ripple effect of such income diversification programs. Consequently, there would be 
significant reduction in poverty among farming households. These effects can particularly be 
stronger given the overall importance of horticultural production in the Kenyan economy and the 
likely spread of supermarkets to regional cities of the country.  
More importantly we have shown that poorer farmers benefit over-proportionally from supplying 
supermarkets. Yet it is this category of farmers who face the threat of exclusion from modern 
supply chains. Interestingly, our analysis has also shown that institutional support enhances 
farmer participation in supermarket channels. However, proper targeting of such institutional 
support is necessary to ensure wider benefit by poorer households. This is particularly important 
in light of the revealed self-selection of farmers into supermarket chains. Such targeted 
intervention will become more crucial as supermarkets expand in the developing world and the 
targeting can benefit from the accurate estimation undertaken here.  
1. Recently, African indigenous vegetables have received renewed attention from upper and middle income 
consumers (Moore and Raymond, 2006; Ngugi et al., 2007). 
2. Initially, supermarkets in Kenya purchased fresh vegetables in traditional wholesale markets, which can still be 
observed today. However, meanwhile supermarkets have diversified their procurement to include contracted farmers 
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Table 1: Differences between farmers supplying supermarket and spot markets 
Variables  Supermarket  
(133)
SD Spot market 
(269)  
SD
Household and farm characteristics 
Total area owned (acres) 2.692
** 5.607 1.870 2.485
Total vegetable area cultivated (acres) 1.168
*** 1.457 0.697 0.992
Share of vegetable area (%) 68.8
* 31.9 62.8 32.5
Use of advanced irrigation equipment (%) 87.9
*** 32.7 71.4 45.3
Age of operator (years) 47 12 49  15
Educations (years of schooling) 10.3
*** 3.14 8.72 4.05
General farming experience (years) 16.16
** 11.60 17.89 13.33
Farmer participation in off-farm employment (%)  61
*** 47 43 50
Plot-level variables   
Fertilizer use (kg/acre) 362.56
** 548.76 494.21    640.19
Pesticide use (ml/acre) 2,251.22  4,083.44 2,745.51    4,382.22
Purchased manure use (kg/acre) 15,926
** 28,107 11,108    19,329
Own manure use (kg/acre) 5,550  15,693 6,107    14,473
Hired labor use (labor days/acre) 215.36
** 296.29 164.28    276.98
Family labor use (labor days/acre) 307
***  395 489
    632
Total labor use (labor days/acre) 522
** 472 653 734
***,** and * Significantly different  at 1% , 5%  and 10% levels respectively  
a 1US dollar = 75 Ksh. 
Table 2: Gross margin differences over market channels 
  Supermarket (n=133) Spot market (n=269)
Mean SD Mean SD
Gross revenue (Ksh/acre)
  116,636
*** 129,370 73,179 60,136
Seed cost (Ksh/acre)  2,175 5,428 1,660 3,021
Hired labor cost (Ksh/acre)
  6,330
** 10,019 4,722 7,481
Cost of other inputs   
     Fertilizer (Ksh/acre)
  4,846
* 7,485 5,781 6,379
     Purchased manure (Ksh/acre)
  8,666
*** 14,099 5,712 8,751
     Pesticides (Ksh/acre) 1,104 1,922 1,179  1,835
Other costs (Ksh/acre)
  1,271
** 4,723 623 2,167
Net income (Ksh/acre)
  92,244
*** 114,202 53,502 54,677
Family labor (Ksh/acre)
  9,775
** 21,297 13,951 16,570
Own manure (Ksh/acre) 2,520 7,253 2,687  7,575
Net income (Ksh/acre)
  79,950
*** 112,246 36,865 54,004
***,** and * Significantly different  at 1% , 5%  and 10% levels respectively  





Table 3: Probit model for determinants of participation in supermarket channel 
  Coefficient SE
Gender of operator (male dummy) 0.383 0.286
Education of operator (years) 0.044* 0.026
Total area owned (acres) 0.060** 0.028
Limuru region (dummy) -0.637 0.490
Kikuyu/Westland region (dummy) 0.900* 0.459
Githunguri and Lower Lari region (dummy) 0.497 0.496
Off farm employment (dummy) 0.342** 0.159
Use of advanced irrigation equipment (dummy) 0.155 0.222
Household access to electricity (dummy) 0.181 0.208
Own means of transportation (dummy) 0.615*** 0.229
Household size (number of people) -0.161*** 0.051
Proximity to tarmac road (dummy) 0.110 0.182
Household access to public piped water (dummy) -0.311* 0.178
Age of operator (years) 0.136*** 0.045
Age of operator squared (years) -0.002*** 4.650
-04
Credit accessed in last 12 months (dummy) 0.012 0.260
Ownership of livestock (dummy) 0.010 0.186
Availability of public transportation in village (dummy) 0.432* 0.242
Participation in FCI market linkage program (dummy) 0.835*** 0.243
Constant -5.003*** 1.199
Number of observations  402
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  













Table 4: Full information maximum likelihood parameter estimates for household income 
  Supermarket suppliers Spot market suppliers
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Dependent variable: household income per capita 
Gender of operator (male dummy) 7.935 39.000 11.730 9.551
Education of operator (years) 1.430 3.282 1.324 0.884
Total area owned (acres) 1.176 1.958 7.234*** 1.412
Limuru region (dummy) 126.000 84.540 11.210 12.330
Kikuyu/Westland region (dummy) -35.230 75.440 5.584 13.110
Githunguri and Lower Lari region (dummy) -62.180 78.900 5.160 13.640
Off farm employment (dummy) 50.990** 20.400 25.380*** 6.299
Use of advanced irrigation equipment (dummy) 9.440 29.830 18.000** 7.257
Household access to electricity (dummy) 8.532 28.070 16.680** 7.281
Own means of transportation (dummy) 87.920*** 23.720 34.470*** 11.720
Household size (number of people) -6.807 5.691 -1.783 1.762
Proximity to tarmac road (dummy) -1.202 19.700 5.251 6.467
Household access to public piped water (dummy) -42.540** 21.230 9.426 6.991
Age of operator (years) 0.900 0.910 -0.143 0.249
Credit accessed in last 12 months (dummy) -62.180** 30.490 -10.620 10.040
Ownership of livestock (dummy) 14.250 25.390 20.550*** 6.371
Constant 76.810 102.800 -36.870* 21.520
ln    4.652*** 0.082
-0.455** 0.215
ln    3.853*** 0.043
-0.020 0.189
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations χ
2 2.870*
Number of observations  402
Log likelihood  -2401.445
F-statistics χ
2  67.700***
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 









Table 5: Simulated effect of participation in supermarket on income and poverty incidence 









Household income per capita (1,000 Ksh) 
All supermarket suppliers 133  72.977  109.260  50
***
By land holdings 
Supermarket suppliers owning  < 1 acres of land  62  52.039  87.494  68
***
Supermarket suppliers owning  1-2 acres of land  29  70.360  100.543  43
***
Supermarket suppliers owning  >2 acres of land  42  105.691  147.411  39 
By income category 
Extremely poor supermarket suppliers 5  58.605  110.337  88
*
Moderately poor supermarket suppliers 12  45.210  68.356  51 
Non-poor supermarket suppliers  116  76.469  113.445  48
***
By supply category 
Direct suppliers  52  76.595  131.582  72
***
Suppliers through traders  35  71.567  101.677  42
**
FCI supported suppliers  46  69.959  89.797  28
*
  Household distribution (%) 
Category 
Extremely poor    3  2  -33 
Moderately poor    3  3  0 
Non-poor   94  95  1 










Figure 1.  Vegetable marketing channels among Kenyan sample farmers 
Vegetable producers 
150  96  Spot market traders  Supermarket traders 
37  119 
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of gross margin by market channel (K-S D-statistics =0.170 (p=0.009)) 
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of per capita household income by market channel (K-S D-statistics 
=0.361 (p=0.000)) 
 
Figure 5: Incidence of poverty by market participation 35 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of land ownership by market participation 
 
 